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The Role of Western Democratic System of Governance in
Exacerbating Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: The Case of Ghana’s
Democratic Dispensation, 1992-2012
David Kwasi Bansah
Kennesaw State University
This paper interrogates the influence of Western forms of democracy on ethnic conflicts in Africa through a case study
of Ghana’s adoption of multiparty democracy between 1992 and 2012. It discusses the transition of African traditional
systems of government before, during, and after colonization. The paper also shows how democracy, by definition
and in terms of governance, cannot solely be a Western idea since many African societies had democratic elements in
their systems of government before the arrival of the Europeans. Relying on qualitative secondary data, and the
analysis of fierce and acrimonious competition that have characterized multiparty democratic elections in postindependence Ghana as case study, the paper inquires if there is any relationship between ethnic rivalries and conflicts
in many African states and the Western-style democratic system.
Keywords: Western, Democratic system, Governance, Ethnic conflict, Democratic dispensation, Ghana

INTRODUCTION
It has been argued that democratic system of
governance is a Western imposition on African states
(Fukuyama, 1989; and Nwauwa, 2003). Prior to the
partition of Africa, many parts of the continent had
empires. While these empires were governed by
traditional rulers based on the concept of kingship,
other smaller groupings had their unique system of
governance without chiefs or kings as their rulers
(Uchendu, 1965). Both centralized and acephalous
societies had ethnic and clan divisions, which
evolved functional conflict management strategies.
This made the incidence of deadly conflicts a rare
phenomenon, particularly when compared to the
rampant and bloody conflicts that has been visible in
the postcolonial African states, as those conflict
management strategies enabled those precolonial

societies to prevent disputes and conflicts from
degenerating into violence. To many, in addition to
the arbitrary partitioning of the African continent
without recourse to language, ethnicity, culture and
religion, the imposition of Western forms of
democracy is at the heart of most of the deadly
conflicts that have been, and are being, fought in
Africa (Ayittey, 1998; Boahen, 1989; Fukuyama,
1989; Parsons, 2010; and Williams, 2011).
Using Ghana’s democratic dispensation between
1992 and 2012 as a case study, this paper assesses the
extent to which Western forms of democracy have
contributed to the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts in
Africa. The reason for choosing Ghana lies in the fact
that the period 1992 to 2012 (i.e., twenty years)
represents the longest period of Ghana’s attempt at
democracy without interruption since her
independence from British colonial rule in 1957. The

paper specifically poses the question: To what extent
does Western democratic system of governance help
to explain or account for ethnic-based conflicts in
contemporary Ghanaian politics?
The paper is organized as follows. The first
section highlights the general historical background
of Africa’s governance, from the pre-colonial to the
post-colonial periods. The second section gives
account of how democratic transition impacts ethnic
conflicts. In the third section, Ghana’s attempt at
democratic
governance
immediately
after
independence from British rule in 1957 is assessed.
The forth section discusses the ethnic factor in
Ghana’s body politic, focusing on multiparty
democratic elections between 1992 and 2012. Based
on the evidence from various perspectives, the paper
concludes by stressing the complicity of the Western
form of democracy in exacerbating ethnic conflicts
in Ghana, and by extension Africa and suggests
possible ways of improving multiparty democratic
elections in order that they do not degenerate into
ethnic violence.

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AND
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
(DEMOCRATIZATION)
Irrespective of how it is defined, democracy is
expected to promote the rule of law and good
governance—in terms of accountability, legitimacy,
and transparency. This is because, in democracies,
the citizens are considered the sovereign as they
freely choose their representatives and replace them
when they see fit through competitive elections. This
enables them to participate (albeit indirectly) in the
making of decisions that affect their lives.
Democracies also have built-in institutional checks
and balances, including the law courts that enable
political differences to be settled authoritatively.
When these institutions function as designed, there is
a reduction in the chances for violence or wars.
Democratic states are also expected to be at peace
with one another, so long as they maintain the
democratic ideals. Hence, scholars of “democratic
peace” school of thought suggest democratization as

a pre-condition for good governance that rest on rule
of law and respect for human rights (Russet, 1993).
However, in spite of its conflict management
potentials the process of change from an
authoritarian regime to democracy can be quite
challenging as most transitional countries often lack
the robust institutional frameworks that functional
democracies necessitate. In such contexts
democratization itself can be a prime source of ethnic
conflicts and wars (Tilly, 2000). In contemporary
Africa, the odds of colonial “divide and rule” system,
and post-colonial political developments or even the
dynamics of globalization, have played major roles
in instigating conflicts, especially among ethnic
groups. This is because the institutional capacity of
most African states is usually weak prior to
democratization.
According to Gill (2000, p. 2), although several
theoretical dimensions exist on the subject, they all
converge at the point where answers are solicited for
the question: “how does democracy come about and
what makes it endure?” Three main elements are
identified by Bunce (2003), cited by Vorrath and
Krebs (2009) as central to a successful and peaceful
democratic transitions. According to him:
 the national and the state question need to be
settled;
 the rules of the transition and the new
political order are the result of bargaining
between a small group of the autocratic elites
and the small group of representatives of the
democratic opposition; and
 the co-operation of the authoritarians can be
secured
through
co-optation.
Thus,
transitions are essentially a compromise
between the old and the new elites.
Regarding the first point, Rustow (1970) stresses
the importance of a consensus on national identity
prior to democratization. Others such as Huntington
(1968), and Linz and Stephen (1996) argue that a
legitimate and viable order has to be established first
before any democratic transition. Reemphasizing the
interaction
between
state-building
and
democratization, Schmitter et al. (2005) write that “a
capable state is not only seen as a precondition for
successful democratization; democratization can
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affect state capacity as well.” Similarly, Bratton and
Chang (2006) contend that, mutually reinforcing
process between state-building and regime
consolidation can become a vicious cycle that may
lead to state decay as the case of Democratic
Republic of Congo shows.
What these studies tried to achieve is the
demonstration
that
state-building
and
democratization cannot work in the same direction.
In other words, a country stands a better chance in its
democratization process when state institutions are
built first. This implies that functioning state
bureaucracy, rule of law, strong political institutions,
etc., are necessary preconditions for any
democratization process. In summary, therefore,
scholars almost agree that where a transition takes
place before the proper institutional foundations
have been laid, democracy is likely to fail (Bunce,
2003; Huntington, 1968; Linz and Stephen, 1996;
Rustow, 1970; Schmitter et al., 2005; and Vorrath
and Krebs, 2009).
In countries where the national and the state
questions have not been settled as well as the nonexistence of viable and legitimate institutional order,
democracy or any democratization process is bound
to face challenges which, more often than not,
manifest along ethnic lines. Thus, it is not surprising
that almost all African states suffer from these
democratic transition pitfalls to the extent that some
scholars call for the identification of appropriate
political institutions that are capable of
accommodating different groups, rather than the
“idealized” condition for democratization. In the
midst of the dilemma, however, the perceived failure
of “democracy” raises the question as to why precolonial African system of government seemed to
have done a better job of apprehending and managing
ethnic cleavages than post-colonial democratic
regimes.
In an attempt to answer the above question,
examples of some traditional African regimes are
cited for the sake of comparison. Not only did these
African governments exhibit democratic tendencies,
they actually followed well-structured systems of
rules and laws that encouraged ethnic cohesion. For
instance, in their comparative analysis of the Akan

(Ghana) and Yoruba (Nigeria) models of traditional
governance Adjei and Adebayo (2014, p. 92),
highlight the traditional conflict adjudication
mechanisms predicated mainly on reconciliation
instead of judicial or court adjudication systems
based on winner-takes-all or zero-sum game
syndrome. More evidences exist on the capabilities
of African precolonial governments in soothing
ethnic cleavages. To further lay the foundation for
this argument, the paper now shifts its attention to the
precolonial systems of governance in Africa.

PRE-COLONIAL AFRICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT AND ETHNICITY
Prior to the arrival of the European colonial powers,
African societies had their own forms of
government. Most of these systems were based on
empires, and every society had a set of rules, laws,
traditions, and customs. These empires were, in
many regards, similar to kingdoms and empires in
Asia and Europe at the same time (Boahen, 1989; and
Parsons, 2010). The king and his councilors and
advisors carried out executive, legislative, and
judicial functions, but in a few instances there were
separations of powers.
Secondly, just as was true in Europe, Asia, and
the Americas, not all African people lived in large
kingdoms. There were smaller centralized political
units called “city states” made up of quite large urban
or semi-urban areas. While these shared much in
common with customs that existed within the larger
African kingdoms, the primary difference here was
in terms of size (e.g. Old Oyo, Ife, Ilorin, and Ibadan
of West Africa; Sofala, Kilwa, Mombasa, and Lamu
of East Africa). The third political system were the
“decentralized,” “acephalous,” or “stateless”
political societies. Most of these societies, in addition
to not having kings, chiefs or ruling elites, were often
made up of neighboring towns and villages that had
no political connections with a larger kingdom or
nation, but were governed by councils of elders. In
all these, the argument has been whether the concept
of democratic governance is exclusively a Western
concept of which African societies now stand
desperately in need of. According to Nwauwa
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(2003), before the contact and subsequent
colonization, Africans practiced some variants of
democracy
alongside
authoritarian
rule.
Unfortunately, Europeans came to undermine this
traditional participatory democratic system for
almost one hundred years, only to revive it on the eve
of decolonization in the form of a parliamentary
system (Ayittey, 1998). Similarly, Adu Boahen
(1989, p. 23) posits that “On all fronts—economic,
political, social, and even intellectual—Africa was in
the mood of change and revolution, accepting new
challenges, showing ability at adaptation and
modification, fighting back racist doctrines, and
above all changing its economy and politics to suite
socioeconomic realities of the day.” These facts,
serve as counter measures to the notion that the
continent of Africa and its people were primitive,
static or undemocratic as the Western colonizers
wanted the world to believe.
Thus, the literature attests that, in the period
preceding colonial rule, Africa’s political
experimentation
ranges
from
direct
and
representative democracy to various forms of
monarchical and decentralized systems (EvansPritchard, 1940; Mair, 1974; Murdock, 1959;
Nwauwa, 2003; and Owusu, 1997). Specifically,
many writers on the democratic credentials of precolonial Africa cite the indigenous political system
of the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria and the Ashanti
of Ghana, as elaborate examples of direct and
participatory democracy in traditional Africa. One of
such writers, Victor Uchendu (1965), isolated two
layers of political structures among the Igbo: the
village and the village-group. According to him and
few others, it was at the village level that democracy
could best be observed. During general assembly,
every male adult directly participated in the
legislative and decision-making process pertaining to
public affairs. In the same vein women had their own
assemblies where social matters were discussed in
the open for which dissenting views were largely
accommodated (Achebe, 1958; Maillu, 1997;
Nwabara, 1977; and Uchendu, 1965).

HOW COLONIALISM DISTORTED AFRICA’S
TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE
After the imposition of colonial rule, the entire
African culture and traditional governance structures
were besieged by Europeans who had ulterior
motives. Governors who were appointed to rule the
colonies had their mandate from metropolitan
European capitals. Being military officers or career
public servants, these governors had little or no
regard for Africans and their government structures.
Instead, they suppressed the African people through
the use of their colonial army and police who only
understood the language of “pure force.” Thus,
several
historians
describe
the
colonial
administrators’ style of governance as oppressive,
dictatorial, and sometimes barbaric (Acemoglu et al.,
2001; Boahen, 1989; Nwauwu, 2003; and Parson,
2010). Almost unanimously, these authors were
convinced that since the colonial administrators
owed their loyalty to those who appointed them, they
became dictatorial, ruling by decrees and
incarcerating Africans without due process of law.
Due to the high-handedness of colonial
administration, pockets of resistance began to
emerge in many parts of Africa. As a result, the
colonial governors resorted to the use of “Indirect
Rule” system where African traditional rulers were
manipulated and used to achieve imperialist goals.
Consequently, chiefs and other elites who were
prepared to demean their status as stooges or “errand
boys” were used against their own African people.
Those who stood firm and challenged the colonial
system, had their traditional titles removed to the
extent that some were forced into exile. In the case
of Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), for instance,
when it became clear that the Asantehene (King)
Agyeman Prempeh I was not accepting the
governor’s directives, he was captured in 1896 and
sent to exile in the Seychelles (Boahen, 1989; Gareth,
1998; Tordoff, 1965; and Hopkins, 1999).
In acephalous states, several colonial chiefs
referred to as “warrant chiefs” were installed and
imposed on the people by the colonial governors.
This subversive attitude of colonial rule,
incidentally, was carried over to the postcolonial era.
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The system ran counter both to the African
precolonial political systems as well as the
postcolonial constitutional democracies.

THE EFFECT OF COLONIAL RULE ON POSTINDEPENDENT AFRICA
As noted by Nwauwa (2003), the wanton
brutality and dictatorship that characterized colonial
regimes were carried forward by many African
nationalists who were at the helm after
independence. Such leaders included Ghana’s
Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia, and Jomo Kenyatta/Arap Moi of
Kenya. Similar to colonial governors, these African
leaders after taking over government became highhanded in dealing with their people. They ruled
beyond the reach of accountability, or what Ayittey
describes as “sultanism” whereby freedom of
expression was curtailed. This brought the
emergence of one-party state that created a breeding
ground for ambitious, corrupt, and dictatorial
African leaders some of whom later surfaced in
military uniforms. For these reasons, many historians
including Basil Davidson think that “African states
inherited dictatorship and not democracy” (Boahen,
1989; Ayittey, 1998; Davidson, 1992; Nwauwa,
2003; Owusu, 1997; and Sklar, 1983).
Consequently, there have been several calls to the
effect that this dominant way of disguising
democracy to achieve parochial interest must be
revisited. For instance, Joseph (1997, p. 365) argues
that “democracy must be expanded into a broader
conceptualization” just as Makinda (1996, p. 557)
thinks that “democracy should be conceived as a way
of government firmly rooted in the belief that people
in any society should be free to determine their
political, economic, social, and cultural systems.”
For David Maillu (1997, p. 255), “a broader concept
of democracy should include cultural definition in
which African democracy like philosophy had to be
lived, theories aside.” He thinks that “African
societies were socially and politically structured such
that everybody participated according to his ability,
ages-status, and wishes” (Maillu, 1997, p.255; see
also Joseph, 1997; and Makinda, 1996). One can ask:

Why did African leaders allow this inherited,
distorted version of democracy to persist?. The next
section deliberates on some of these reasons using
Ghana’s democracy as an example.

GHANA’S POST-INDEPENDENCE
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS
Many states in Africa experienced frequent regime
changes soon after independence. Continued
economic scarcity coupled with the interplay of
political forces left little doubt in analysts’ mind that
instability and ethnic upheaval was going to shape
the post-colonial future of many African countries
(Davidson, 1992). Ghana had its share of this
prediction when, after her independence in 1957, the
country witnessed a system that was geared towards
increased state control. Initially under its first leader,
Kwame Nkrumah, deliberate attempt was made to
establish majoritarian democracy which later
transformed into a kind of hegemonic control.
Rothchild’s narrative portrays Ghana’s post-colonial
regime as “periodic shifts from polyarchy, hegemony
control, military autocracy to democracy” (Rothchild
1997, p. 18).
To make matters worse, a military take-over in
1972 changed the political terrain of Kwame
Nkrumah’s majoritarian democracy/hegemonic
control to military autocracy under General Kutu
Acheampong and at some point military-populism
under Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings from
1981 to 1992. Rawlings’ regime, which by 1983
could be described as a classical form of bureaucratic
centralism due to its military cum civilian
composition, experienced several domestic public
agitations for political reforms. Amidst international
pressure, the regime had no choice but to organize
democratic elections in 1992 based on a new national
constitution. Since then, although sometimes
witnesses some level of political turbulence, Ghana
has been making efforts to strengthen multiparty
democracy and general elections have been held
every four years.
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THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN GHANA’S GENERAL
ELECTIONS 1992-2012
The ethnic dimension to voting patterns during
Ghana’s current 4th Republican Constitution (1992
Constitution) has its prelude from the general
political atmosphere before and immediately after
independence in 1957. After independence, Ghana’s
modern state formation based on its centralized
governance structures coupled with the colonial
legacy began to receive various forms of ethnic
responses. Political parties that contested Ghana’s
first election in 1956 included the Northern People’s
Party (NPP), Togoland Congress (TC), the
Convention People’s Party (CPP), and the National
Liberation Movement (NLM). As their names sound,
except for the CPP which tried to balance the ethnic
card, the NPP was predominantly meant for ethnic
groups located in the northern part of Ghana, TC was
for the Ewes in the Trans Volta Togoland, and the
NLM was dominated by the Akans. Unfortunately,
the expectations of the ethnic-colored parties were
not meet. While the CPP won seventy-one (71) seats,
the NPP, TCP, and NLM won fifteen (15), twelve
(12), and two (2) respectively. In addition to the
physical clashes, arson and violence that
characterized the electoral process, there was clear
evidence to the effect that “tribal” politics had little
impact in Ghana’s democratization process.
This notwithstanding, there have been some
deliberate efforts by political elites to cash-in on the
blurry ethnic divisions in Ghana mostly for parochial
interests. Consequently, the nation’s elections have
followed ethnic lines but with a kind of staggered
trend over the years. This scenario encompasses the
politics since 1992 involving the two vibrant political
parties: The National Democratic Congress (NDC)
and New Patriotic Party (NPP). Table 1 depicts the
regional (ethnic) voting trend between these two
vibrant parties, NDC and NPP, between 1992 and
2012.
In this period, a total of six (6) general elections
were held in Ghana. The 1992, 1996, and 2000
elections indicate reasonable ethnic trends,
particularly between the regions of Volta and
Ashanti. While landslide votes were recorded by the

National Democratic Congress (NDC) in the Volta
region under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings
(Rtd.) on the basis of his ethnic lineage, his
counterpart Professor Albert Adu Boahen of New
Patriotic Party (NPP) had massive votes from his
native region, Ashanti. In spite of the fact that this
trend continued in all subsequent elections, their
magnitude continue to change which political
analysts claim are results of presidential candidates’
personality factors (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi,
2004; Senaya, 2008).
It is worth noting that the personality factor
seemed to have worked positively such that
government has changed hands three consecutive
times between the two dominant parties of NDC and
NPP in spite of their labels as Ewe and Ashanti
parties respectively. Thus, the NPP took over for two
terms (2000 and 2004) after the NDC’s initial first
two terms (1992 and 1996). The baton again changed
back to the NDC in 2008 which won its second term
in 2012. Suggestively, voter education is gradually
shifting towards “issue-based” rather than “ethnicbased” politics in Ghana, thus, a sign of good
democratization process. One of the instances that
supports the idea that voters are shifting away from
ethnic lines was the example of 2008 general
elections. The winner of the 2008 election, Prof.
Attah Mills, a Fante (Akan) from the Central region,
who stood on the ticket of the NDC party labeled as
Ewe party, won an overwhelming majority vote from
the Volta (Ewe) region compared to his region Akan
homeland. As shown by Ghana’s political map (see
Figure 1), the Akan ethnic group comprise mainly of
Ashanti, Eastern, Central, Brong Ahafo and Western
regions. Per the Electoral Commission of Ghana
(2008) results in Table 2, Prof. Attah Mills did far
better in the Ewe speaking region (82.88% in Volta)
than his home region (50.58% in Central).

THE LIABILITY OF WESTERN FORMS OF
DEMOCRACY FOR ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN
GHANA AND ELSEWHERE
The African traditional system of government as has
been alluded to earlier in this paper precipitated on
the concept of majoritarian inclusiveness. Even
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without the incorporation of multiparty elections as
is the case today, African societies were able to
choose their leaders and lived in harmony.
Convincingly, it appeared that citizens at the time
were more concerned with their role in decisionmaking processes rather than how their leaders were
selected. The wisdom behind this line of thinking
stemmed from the fact that traditional leaders were
seen more or less as “figure heads” who upheld the
internal decision-making control measures on all
major issues that affected the larger group. Thus,
even though the method of selecting traditional
leaders may be considered to lack transparency,
limited to only few elders and kingmakers,
considerable “behind the scenes” consultations
involving clan and family heads characterized the
selection process. Thus, if one has the option to
compare post-independence democratic multiparty
system of government with that of traditional system
of government in terms of their conflict control
mechanisms, it may suffice to conclude that
multiparty democracy has been more ethnically
conflict prone. Over time, most multiparty elections
have been fiercely contested because of the “winnertakes-all” policy that goes with it. In other words,
ethnic clusters in a particular state have everything to
lose if a contestant from their origin fails to win in an
election. Considering the many civil wars Africa has
witnessed in recent memory, multiparty democratic
elections’ complicity in orchestrating ethnic violence
cannot be in doubt. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya,
Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, North and South Sudan,
Zimbabwe, and Nigeria are but a few examples
where civil wars were the direct result of election
disagreements.
In Liberia for instance, what one might call a
prelude to the civil war started when Samuel Doe’s
Krahn ethnic group was politically marginalized
against the Gio, Mandingo and Mano ethnic groups
who were loyal to the opposition leader, Charles
Taylor (Ellis, 1999). Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire’s
situation presented Laurent Gbagbo’s southern
ethnic groups’ devotion to maintain Gbagbo as the
president even when it was obvious that he lost the
election to Alassane Quattara in its 2010 multiparty
democratic election. The result of this was a war

between the ethnic groups belonging to the camps of
these leaders with heinous civilian casualties. The
stories remain the same for all the states listed above.
What is worth noting in all these is how democracy
as it is being practiced in Africa has nurtured ethnic
conflicts that were not, hitherto, known in the
affected regions. In other words the Western form of
democracy has done more harm than good in terms
of the escalating ethnic rivalries on the continent.
But, can there be any good lessons to be learned from
multiparty democracy as it is being practiced in the
Western world? Based on the literature, the flipside
also holds a good promise that when practiced with
all the prerequisites in place, democracy can
engender societal stability and development.
Contrary to these bad cases, in Ghana one may
be right to suggest that the country has been able to
escape violent ethnic conflicts largely because of
some good governance and conflict management
strategies enshrined in her political electioneering
process. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, besides
guaranteeing the freedom of all citizens and the right
to vote and be voted for in multiparty democratic
elections, also put in place several other practical
conflict management mechanisms. In its 2014
governance assessment report, the World Bank
describes Ghana as a country that continues to show
good performance on domestic governance. The
report specifically indicates among others, that
Ghana has strong multi-party political system,
growing media pluralism, and strong civil society
activism (World Bank, 2014). Again, Asante and
Gyima-Boadi
(2004)
commend
Ghana’s
constitutional democracy since 1992 in their study on
“Ethnic Structures, Inequality and Governance of the
Public Sector in Ghana.” Part of their findings asserts
that “although ethnic rivalries and jealousies exist
among certain ethnic groups which sometimes foster
conflicts, Ghana’s governance institutions and public
policies have been generally sensitive to the complex
challenges presented by the heterogeneous nature of
the society” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.
135).
It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that
Ghana’s electoral rules appear to have been on the
majoritarian “winner-takes-all” model, there is also
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adequate safeguards that protect the minority group
that do not vote for the winning party. Thus, the
formula for sharing the “national cake” is based on
fairness and needs instead of on an ethnic group’s
loyalty to a regime. For example, between 1992 and
2000 during President Rawlings’ regime under NDC
(Ewe dominated party), the Ashanti region where the
NDC’s least votes came from was reported to have
received the largest chunk of development projects
(Andre and Meple-Somps, 2006). One of the reasons
behind this is the fact that beyond the pursuance of
its electoral mandate, the government needs a
peaceful country to govern. Thus, paying attention to
the losers of an election is a clever way of controlling
electoral related conflicts in an ethnically divided
society. Again, Ghana’s constitutions since
independence have entrenched the “avoidance of
discrimination act” where governments over the
years are mandated to share resources fairly
irrespective of ethnic voting trends [Article 35 (1) of
1969; Article 42 (5) of 1979; and Article 55 (4) of
1992].
Additionally, other non-constitutional provisions
on election matters have also received popularity
within the Ghanaian society over the years. Viewed
as a conflict management tool, prior to its 2012
general elections, all contestants or candidates were
assembled before prominent traditional rulers to take
an oath that they would abide by the election result.
On top of all these, the sensitivity of Ghanaians
including political elites to seek the “rule of law” in
solving conflicts cannot be over emphasized.
Ghana’s decision to use the court system to deal with
her recent (2012) presidential election dispute was
hailed by the world as a case worth emulating.

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
In this paper four main tasks have been attempted.
The paper tried to narrate the way Africans governed
themselves before the arrival of Europeans and how
colonization truncated its progress. The myth
surrounding the white-man’s notion as the exclusive
originator of democratic concept has been explained.
The paper also exposes the sense in which African
states
transitioned
into
post-independence

governance and how the challenges created by
colonial rule, including ethnic conflicts, are being
positively dealt with, using Ghana as a case. Finally,
the paper provided some good thoughts on conflict
management mechanisms that may be necessary for
democratic governance to thrive in Africa such that
the current spate of post-election ethnic conflicts
may be minimized.
It is made clear through the discussions that the
colonial governors took advantage of the
vulnerability of the African people by using their
own traditional system to perpetrate their agenda
through “divide and rule.” In so doing, the structures
of political, economic, social, and cultural
development in Africa were distorted. On the
question of whether democratic strand in governance
was a Western idea, the historical analyses based on
several intellectual perspectives asserted that the
concept of democracy in Africa could first be traced
to African traditional regimes. In fact, the example of
Igbo of southeastern Nigeria, among many others, is
cited as well-structured democracies prevailing in
Africa prior to colonial rule. European colonialists
ignored these democratic governance structures;
instead, they imposed autocratic colonial rule on the
people As independence loomed, the last batch of
colonial governors tried desperately to now impose
“democracy” which came little too late. The
question, then, is: Assuming African societies were
allowed to continue with their precolonial way of
selecting leaders, would ethnic conflicts have been
minimal?
Linking the argument to the case under
consideration, the discussions has shown the extent
to which Ghana, for instance, has struggled (and still
struggles) to bring back the good old days of
traditional governance, which significantly ensured
political, economic, social, and cultural cohesion
among ethnic groups. In the aftermath of
colonialism, the attempt to institute democracy was
faced with conflicts, most of which had ethnic
undertones. Democracy, in Western context, has
been the creator or escalator of new ethnic conflicts,
especially given the rate at which civil wars result
from multiparty democratic elections in Africa. On
the other hand based on Ghana’s example, it is also
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fair to conclude that democracy per se cannot be
blamed for ethnic rivalries in African societies.
Rather, democratic system of governance, if
practiced in the context of the local culture of the
people can bring about peace.
The fact that Ghana has not experienced any fullscale ethnic conflict as we have seen in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Cote d’Ivoire suggests
that strengthening democracy through multi-party

elections based on rule of law, press freedom,
pluralism, strong civil society, fair distribution of
state resources, etc., the future could be bright for
Africa. Specifically, it is my recommendation that it
is about time African nations put the colonial past
behind them and work towards building good
governance structures that minimizes corruption and
electoral malpractices.

TABLES
Table 1: Ashanti and Volta Regional Presidential Election Results between NDC & NPP (%)
Region/Year/
Ashanti
Volta

1996
NDC NPP
32.87 60.54
93.24 3.61

2000
NDC NPP
20.11 79.89
88.47 11.53

2004
NDC NPP
24.06 74.61
83.83 14.26

2008
NDC NPP
25.01 74.99
86.06 13.94

2012
NDC NPP
*N/A *N/A
*N/A *N/A

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana’s website (www.ec.gov.gh). *Figures not displayed at the time of writing this paper.

Table 2: 2008 Presidential Election Regional Percentage Votes Won by Professor Attah Mills, Candidate for NDC
Region
Vote (%)

Ashanti
26.13

B/A
47.70

Central
50.58

Eastern
41.10

G/A
52.11

Northern
56.84

U/E
56.06

U/W
54.36

Volta
82.88

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana’s official website (www.ec.gov.gh)
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Western
47.06

MAP
Figure 1: Regional Map of Ghana

Source: Political Map of Ghana. Retrieved from http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/geography/maps.php
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